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SOME PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF SKEPTICISM 
Jim K. Swindler 
Although it is an important tradition in Western philosophical 
thought, skepticism has for a number of reasons been perennially 
misunderstood, abused and ridiculed. To clarify what is fundamental 
to skeptical thought-I wish to review the phases through which it 
has passed in its long growth and to bring its terrain into sharp 
focus by contrasting it with its nearest neighbors. 
Just as speculative philosophy has something of a spiritual 
father in the figure of Socrates, skepticism is the direct 
descendant of the fourth century Greek philosopher, Pyrrho of 
Elis, hence the archaic use of "Pyrrhonism" as a synonym for 
"skepticism." Since we have none of Pyrrho's works, historians 
have had to rely upon testimony, especially from his disciple 
the satirist Tiraon of Phlius (whose works are only known in frag-
ments), to determine what he believed and how he lived. 1 It seems 
necessary to consider the work of Pyrrho and Timon as a single 
philosophy. If a distinction is to be made, it is that Pyrrho 
was concerned to live the tranquillity he taught, while Timon, 
being more gregarious, seems to have delighted in engaging in 
being a "general railer" against "all dogmatic philosophers." 2 
Timon says that Pyrrho supposed three questions to be funda-
mental in philosophy. 3 The first is What is the nature of things? 
Pyrrho answered that the nature of reality is indeterminable and 
therefore cannot be known. This assertion seems to depend on the 
basic distinction between appearance and reality. Timon says, "I 
do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears 
to be so."4 The grounds for the assertion are human limitations. 
The senses reveal only appearances, reason distills to mere habit 
and prejudice. Having given up both, tampering of either by the 
other is lost as well. Knowledge is therefore impossible. 
Pyrrho's second question is What is the proper attitude 
toward reality? Since all is indeterminable, the attempt to gain 
knowledge can only frustrate the seeker. We ought therefore to 
abstain from theoretical assertions and cultivate an attitude of 
indifference toward reality. He ought not to judge, allowing 
always that what appears may be the opposite of what is and that 
all assertions are but expressions of an individual's state of 
mind. The only proper attitude is epoche, suspension of judgment. 
Pyrrho's life serves as an agoge or exemplary mode of living. He 
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remained silent on metaphysical matters and led a life guided by 
the compulsion of his feelings, the tradition of laws and customs, 
the instruction of the arts and nature. 
The third question Pyrrho asked was What is the value of 
adopting this attitude? The question was apparently answered by 
facts. Timon claims that ataraxia, mental tranquillity, follows 
inevitably upon the heels of epoche. Most speculation in Pyrrho's 
time concerned moral matters and Pyrrho too was primarily concerned 
with the summum bonum. Since knowledge is impossible knowledge of 
what conduces to real happiness is impossible. The only value left 
is to live undisturbed. By eliminating the possibility of knowledge, 
Pyrrho effectively terminated any inquiry into happiness and was 
left with the necessity of being satisfied without happiness, with 
only tranquillity. Since all was only indicative of states of mind, 
Pyrrho had to be content with what he felt was the least intolerable 
state of mind, ataraxia. 
There are a number of problems involved in Pyrrho's philosophy 
which have continued to be sources of difficulty for skeptics up to 
the present. The first is the skeptic's paradox. If reality is 
indeterminable, that it is so is likewise indeterminable. It is 
impossible to know that knowledge is impossible. If we ought to 
abstain from theoretical assertion, we ought not to assert that 
we ought so to abstain, for such a normative assertion is theoreti-
cal. Even if ataraxia did overcome Pyrrho and Tiraon, what assurance 
is there that epoche will yield the same result for anyone else? if 
knowledge is impossible, how can I know that Pyrrho's agoge will 
serve me as well as it did him? And how is a completely conserva-
tive life possible, since there seem to be conflicting inclinations, 
times of political transition, and opposing natural forces? To 
these problems the earliest Pyrrhonists gave no resolution, and 
this in turn caused a certain cynical attitude toward skepticism 
on the part of non-skeptics and resulted ultimately in moderation 
of the claims of later skeptics. 
Pyrrho claimed also that once ataraxia is acheived there is 
no longer any desire to ask the questions that gave rise to it. 
The questions and their answers simply fade from awareness as 
tranquillity sets in. This gave rise to the favorite analogy of 
ancient and renaissance skeptics, that between skepticism on the 
one hand and purgative medicines on the other. In early Greek 
medicine disease was thought to be an imbalance in the humours of 
the body 5 just as philosophical puzzlement was taken by Pyrrho to 
be a disturbance caused by a desire to know that was too great to 
be satisfied by the reality that was to be known. The remedy for 
disease was to restore the balance of humours by purging the body 
of those in excess. Pyrrho's remedy for the disease of philosophy 
was to purge the mind of the desire to know. And, just as the 
purgative eliminates itself along with the excess humours, so the 
theory that knowledge of reality is impossible was supposed to 
cure the desire to know reality and likewise terminate belief in 
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in the theory that knowledge is impossible, which was supposed to 
bring the 30ul to ataraxia. This analogy is significant first 
because it has furnished skeptics with a conception of themselves 
as physicians treating philosophers as patients and second because 
it points to a fundamental difficulty with which skeptics have had 
to contend, the problem of identifying dogma without catching them-
selves in dogmatic assertion. It will be more convenient to raise 
this problem in the context of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
After Timon, Pyrrhonism seems to have died out,6 and was not 
revived until Aenesidemus of Knosses constructed the first theoret-
ical formulation about 43 B.C. at Alexandria.7 Apparently, for 
Aenesidemus, Pyrrhonism was only the first step to Heracliteanism. 8 
But along the way he produced ten tropoi or modes of argument that 
were designed to combat dogmatism with relativism and eight that 
attacked aetiologies or theories of causation. There is nothing 
in the first ten tropes that is particularly new or devastating, 9 
for they all have to do with ways the senses may be deceived. His 
eight tropes on causation show considerable insight and may have 
been the high water mark in ancient thought on the subject. The 
first comes close to Hume's realization that, search as we might, 
the connection between events that we call cause forever eludes us. 
Beyond this, Aenesidemus argued against the Academics Arcesilaus 
and Carneades, that if there is no criterion for the truth then 
there is no criterion for the probable either. He seems also to 
have believed that the end of philosophy was ataraxia and that 
epoche was the only means to that end. Very little else of cer-
tainty is known of Asnesidemus. 
If Pyrrho was the spiritual father of skepticism, Sextus 
Empiricus is the best representative of the first true skeptics. 
For he was, so far as history reveals it, the first philosopher to 
assemble a sufficient number of the pieces of the logical puzzle 
which Pyrrho and Timon had left to approach the critical balance 
required to sustain the skeptical stance. Sextus is to skepticism 
as Euclid is to geometry; he was an assembler and systematizer. 
His major work is a compendium of techniques and arguments (tropoi) 
designed to dissolve dogmatism in general and Stocism in particular. 
He attributed eighteen of his twenty-five tropes to Aenesidemus and 
the rest to other more or less known skeptics. But in Sextus' works 
we have what must be taken as the definitive statement of the last 
and culminating phase of Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
According to Sextus, "Skepticism is an ability, or mental 
attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way what-
ever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the 
objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a 
state of mental suspence, and next to a state 'of unperturbedness' 
or quietude."10 He abstains from distinguishing appearance from 
reality as Pyrrho did, instead he opposes appearance (sense per-
ceptions or phenomena) to theories about reality. In this way he 
; avoids at least one of Pyrrho's entanglements in the skeptic's 
I paradox. He retains the goal of skepticism as Pyrrho saw it, 
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suspension of judgment and mental tranquillity. He therefore 
escapes the epistemological while nevertheless refusing to deal 
with the ethical paradox. But Sextus' definition has the double 
virtue of delineating skepticism as a response to dogmatic phi-
losophy and showing the notion of 'skeptical doctrine' to be a 
contradiction in terms. Failure to understand these points has 
contributed to the common misunderstanding of skepticism. 
At the heart of Sextus' work is the notion of balancing the 
sides of the scale of argument. He says that the fundamental 
principle of skepticism "is that of opposing to every proposition 
an equal proposition," (p. 9) one with weight enough to cancel the 
effect of the other. How is it that the skeptic is able to deter-
mine the real weights of arguments and appearances in order to 
balance the scale? The answer is that he need only rely upon the 
appearance of weight in appearances and arguments, for he is dealing 
only with relative weights and his goal is not 'the truth' but 
epoche and ataraxia. With regard to the dogmatist, Sextus is only 
concerned to show him enough weight in counter-arguments and 
examples from experience to shake his faith in his own assertions, 
the assumption being that dogmatic theories are more inadequate 
than wrong. Sextus therefore accepts as his groundwork a sort of 
naive realism: "our doubt does not concern the appearance itself 
but the account given of that appearance1* (p. 12) . Much misplaced 
criticism has resulted from the erroneous belief that skeptics 
doubt the experiences we should rightly call ordinary. But 
skeptics acknowledge their humanity and so Sextus sometimes counters 
mere assertion with what he takes to be facts. The use of 'facts' 
to show the inadequacy of philosophical theories has been called 
the 'method of reminders' and is complimented in Sextus' arsenal 
by what I shall call the method of 'tit for tat,' and further 
by the method of opposing facts with counter-facts. By 'tit for 
tat* I mean the contravention of a theory by the production of an 
opposite theory which will appear equal in weight. Sextus says, 
"We oppose appearances to appearances, or objects of thought to 
objects of thought or alternando"(p. 23). To catalogue the work-
ings of these methods, he gives his twenty-five modes of argument 
and recommends the use of nine "formulae" or phrases which succinct-
ly express skeptical moves. There are in his compendium few sur-
prises, for Sextus' modes have been adopted by philosophers of all 
sorts for centuries to criticize the thought of their opponents. 
Sextus himself disclaims knowledge of their validity (pp. 23-25) 
and points out that they can be used to cancel themselves (p. 15) . 
The arguments all have specific targets among the dogmatic theories 
of Sextus' contemporaries and should not be taken as theoretical 
assertions of skeptical doctrine. For example, it is wrong to 
conclude from mode number eight, which is an argument for general 
relativism, that Sextus is a relativist in the dogmatic sense. 
Sextus' goal is not merely to win arguments. He wants dogmatists 
to recognize the futility of theorising and to see them return to 
living ordinary lives guided by customs, law, the compulsion of 
feelings, and nature. They will thus be able to live as tranquilly 
as possible under whatever conditions obtain and they will not be 
compelled by what is "non-evident"(pp. 19-21). 
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That Sextus held epoche to be the summuro b on urn seems clear in 
spite of his occasional denials.H The end of skepticism is 
ataraxia, the means is epoche, and in practice it consists in 
using the modes and formulas and living a conservative life (p. 17). 
One of the problems with Pyrrho's philosophy was that he had 
reasoned, too hastily, from the impossibility of knowledge to the 
assertion that we should not seek it. Sextus, on the other hand, 
wisely refrains from the epistemological claim. But in so doing he 
gave up his basic premise, leaving himself holding a dangling con-
clusion without the argument to which it belonged. Unless it is 
asserted that knowledge is impossible, there is no reason for sus-
pending judgment or for seeking ataraxia. Of the tripartite 
Pyrrhonian skepticism, Sextus explicitly retained the ethical 
second and third parts, epoche and ataraxia. But, even though 
there is as much paradox in each of these as there was in the 
epistemological, Sextus' overthrow of the Pyrrhonian belief in the 
impossibility of knowledge should be considered a purification of 
skepticism. Even so, there is another criticism that can be made. 
Sextus' recognition that he must avoid the skeptic's paradox at 
all costs is itself indicative that he believes that paradox to be 
real and true, which means that, despite his claim that appearance 
is the only skeptical criterion (p. 16) he holds consistency to be 
yet higher. 
Skepticism died out after Sextus and was not revived until 
Wittgenstein re-entered philosophy, after an absence of several 
years, in 1929. Even though it is often difficult to state 
Wittgenstein's arguments or to see the target of his thought, 
just as with Sextus, the particulars are only temporarily important. 
As soon as they have performed their purgative function, they carry 
themselves away en masse. There are, however, several powerful 
currents in Wittgenstein's thought which correspond to those in 
Sextus'. The first is the intellectually hypnotising power of 
theoretical pictures of reality. The cure for this sort of blind-
ness is to return to our ordinary uses of language. So we encounter 
the Wittgensteinian use of the 'method of reminders,' the object of ' 
which is to shatter the dogmatist's belief in a single reality 
corresponding to some word or phrase that is then used in some 
significant way in his philosophical theories. "My aim is: to 
teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something 
that is patent nonsense. "12 To this end, he employs his so-called 
"use theory of meaning." He says, "For a large class of classes— 
though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can 
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." 
(p. 20 e) Throughout his later writings (post 1929) he therefore 
directs philosophers' attention to the ways words are actually 
used in the language we speak. 
Likewise, we find him using the method of "tit for tat" with 
the object of shaking dogmatic belief in theories while carefully 
avoiding merely replacing one theory with another equally as in-
adequate. Thus he counters Cartesian mind/body dualism with the 
so-called "private language argument." Out of Wittgenstein's 
apparently rambling remarks the argument may be interpreted as 
three successive syllogisms: 
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I. 1. To obey a rule is to follow a custom, it is 
a practice. (Philosophical Investigations 
(hereafter P.I.) , I, 199, 2021 
2. It is possible to be mistaken in believing 
that one is obeying a rule only because one's 
practice exhibits that one is wrong. (P. I., I, 
201, 202) 
II. .*. 1. It is not possible to obey a rule privately 
because there is no practice to use as 
criterion in such a case. (£.•!•# 1/ 202, 258) 
2. To use a word meaningfully is to obey a rule 
for its use in a language. <£.•!•/ 1/ 43) 
III. .•. 1. One cannot use a word meaningfully privately 
(P.I., I, 258, 260) 
2. To have a private language is to use words 
meaningfully and privately. (P-I.., I# 243) 
;. A private language is not possible. (£.•!.•» I» 258) 
Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of the Cartesian private 
world, he is only showing that it is not possible to speak meaning-
fully wholly within such a world. The conclusion of the argument 
is that human beings are something like what P. F. Strawson refers 
to technically as "persons," "a type of entity such that both 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates 
ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc. are 
equally applicable to a single individual of that type." And, 
since a private language is impossible and persons use language, it 
makes no sense to speak of people as dualistic entities whose ex-
pressions are ineffable because utterly private. For present pur-
poses it is sufficient to notice that, if using a word correctly 
means following the rule of its usage, then language must consist 
in a system of rules by which it is possible to determine the 
correctness of any particular use of a word. Wittgenstein never 
makes such a claim; but this essentialist conception of the nature 
of language constitutes an unstated premise of the private language 
argument and amounts to the assertion that both the rules of a 
language and the language itself must be public. But by avoiding 
such a definition of language Wittgenstein, unlike Strawson, 
avoids committing himself to the truth of the conclusion and there-
fore the skeptic's paradox. 
Wittgenstein also uses Sextus' method of opposing "facts" with 
"facts," but he does it in the process of analysing language in-
stead of physical objects. For example, he reminds us of the usual 
meaning attached to the predicates of such phrases as "there is a 
tree over there" in contrast to the meaning philosophers attach to 
phrases like "there is an essence of number." Such reminders are 
directed at pointing out the distinction between the "depth" and 
"surface" grammar of words like "is." The similarity of sentential 
uses of such words gives rise to the belief that they are con-
ceptually all the same, and this trains us to see and use them the 
same way in and out of philosophy. "Our problem," he says, "is not 
49 50 
a causal but a conceptual one" (P.I. p. 20 3«). " A main cause of 
philosophical disease is a one sTded diet: one nourishes one's 
thinking with only one kind of example " (P.I., p. 1556). 
At times Wittgenstein uses specific modes of argument that 
are virtually identical to those of Sextus. One major theme of 
the Investigations is the notion of "forms of life" to which all 
thought, all speech, indeed all sentient existence, are relative. 
A being's form of life determines what is necessary for it, e.g., 
1+1=2 necessarily for us. But "if anyone believes that certain 
concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different 
ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let 
him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different 
from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different 
from the usual ones will become intelligible to him" (P.I. 203®). 
Thus the argument for extreme relativism that turned up Tn Sextus' 
eighth mode and elsewhere turns up in Wittgenstein's work, but 
altered so that it confronts modern rather than ancient dogmatists. 
A being's form of life functions as a source of possible systematic 
deception. It is then a generalized conception of notions like 
Descartes' "demon hypothesis," and the possibility which Aeneside-
mus raised (and that Montaigne introduced into the modern world!4) 
that we may need faculties utterly different from any we posses to 
apprehend reality. The whole matter is put neatly by Montaigne, 
"Thou seest nothing but the order and regulation of this little 
vault wherein thou art lodged—if thou dost see so much . . . " (p. 252). 
Substituting any conception that is sufficient to disrupt any 
particular theory of reality for Montaigne's "vault," this mode of 
argument is at once the most general and the most powerful of 
skeptical weapons. For it relies upon there being any faint pos-
sibility that a philosopher's criterion for truth may be wrong, 
which means that the philosopher's imagination is pitted against 
itself, and how could it but lose? To illustrate, most of us seem 
to believe that the basics of arithematic would necessarily hold in 
all possible worlds. But consider: Would a set of conditions under 
which 2+2=4 had no application whatever be the same as ours in its 
metaphysical features? No answer can be given unless those condi-
tions are described, but notice, it is not necessary to describe 
the conditions of some other world to introduce the possibility 
that we may be systematically deluded in this one. 
Perhaps the most original of Wittgenstein's techniques is his 
use of "family resemblances" to counter essentialist arguments. 
The anti-essentialism of Sextus shows up mainly in his first ten 
modes where he argues from relativism. Wittgenstein, on the other 
hand, is willing to allow that there appears to be some commonality 
in some objects of experience and some concepts, which leads the 
dogmatist to assert that they are essentially the same. But es-
sentiality is too great a claim for a skeptic. So, after reminding 
us of the variety of uses for the word "language" (which he develops 
by using the device of "language games"), Wittgenstein says, 
Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing 
in common which makes us use the same v/ord for a l l , — 
but that they are related to one another in many 
different ways. And it is because of this relation-
ship, or these relationships, that we call them all 
'language' . . . I can think of no better expression 
to characterize these similarities than 'family 
resemblances;' for the various resemblances between 
members of a family: build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-
cross in the same way (£.•!•» PP- 3ie-32e) . 
And just as what constitutes relations between members of a family 
depends upon the culture the family is in, so when we think we 
find essential qualities that define real classes, the qualities 
we find and the ones we call essential depend upon our condition, 
especially when raised to the level of forms of life. 
What even more fundamentally links Sextus and Wittgenstein 
than the techniques they use is the use they make of their techniques. 
For it is obvious that the techniques and even some of the arguments 
they use have been used by philosophers who are not skeptics. I 
shall shortly discuss a few such philosophers, but first we should 
get clear about Sextus' and Wittgenstein's reasons for doing 
philosophy. Sextus admits that the Pyrrhonians began by seeking 
the truth. But, when frustration followed on frustration and they 
realized that it always had, they resolved not to theorize. A 
marvelous thing happened, "they found that quietude, as if by 
chance, followed upon their suspense (of judgment), even as a 
shadow follows its substance."15 And Wittgenstein has said that 
his object in philosophy was to "show the fly the way out of the 
bottle " (P.I,., p. 10 3 e), to bring philosophers to the point where 
they can quit philosophizing because they are no longer in quandaries 
over philosophical puzzles, to cure the disease of philosophy. There 
is implicit in both the Pyrrhonian and the Wittgensteinian discovery 
of the tranquilizing effect of being satisfied with the ordinary and 
the evident, a very deep humility. It is this humility that sets 
skepticism most sharply in contrast with dogmatism of all sorts. It 
is this humility that makes ordinary men seem "civilized" to Wittgen-
stein and it is the belief that they know that makes philosophers 
seem "primitive." 
But search all you wish, you will find in Wittgenstein's work 
no such normative principles as Pyrrho and Sextus give. Wittgen-
stein claims neither a conservative nor a liberal life to be best. 
In a certain sense we cannot help but follow nature (our form of 
life) so there is no point in making that an ethical imperative 
either. And anyway, he only uses forms of life to jostle dogmatic 
belief. All Wittgenstein retains of the original Pyrrhonian 
skepticism in its positive aspect is belief in the futility, in 
fact the positive harmfulness, of believing in the truth of the 
theories we create. He doesn't have anything against theorizing, 
after all that is an integral part of the skeptical enterprise. 
But there is only frustration to be gained from believing that 
reality has been understood, that it has been snared by a theory. 
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This may be taken as a normative claim: One ought not to believe. 
But for Wittgenstein it is strictly analogous to a doctor telling 
a patient not to overeat or to add such and such to his diet. From 
one perspective it is possible to trap Wittgenstein in the skeptic's 
paradox only if one assumes that it is necessary to call a disease 
bad to identify it as a disease; but, given the utterly naive 
realism Sextus and Wittgenstein seem to adopt, this objection is 
impotent because all they need and all they claim is the appearance 
of disease, the principal symptom of which is the desire to know 
reality. On the other hand, whether Sextus and Wittgenstein have 
really identified a disease is somewhat beside the point, for they 
are ready to call one condition better than another, ataraxia better 
than wonder, and to prescribe their cure, epoche or the giving up 
of philosophy. To be ready to identify and cure a disease they 
must use some notion of what constitutes health and in both cases 
they have judged an attitude somewhere between atheoretical and 
apathetic to be healthy. Their philosophy is entirely informed by 
the judgment that doubt is superior to belief in philosophical 
matters. And like flies caught in a spider's web, the more they 
squirm, the more entangled they become in their own paradox. 
At any rate, the history of skepticism, properly so-called, 
displays a gradual diminution of principles from Pyrrho and Timon's 
three, that knowledge is impossible, that one ought to practice 
epoche, and that the reward is ataraxia; to Aenesidemus and Sextus' 
two, that one ought to suspend judgment and that tranquillity will 
result; to Wittgenstein's implicit one, that one ought not to 
believe philosophical theories. But methodologically the movement 
has remained quite constant. In general all the methods of skep-
ticism turn on the contention that no criterion for judging theo-
retical claims to be true has been found. The matter may be taken 
one step further. Not only is there no way of telling when we 
should affirm that an assertion is the truth, there is likewise no 
criterion for determining when it is appropriate to doubt. Wittgen-
stein says in response to a doubt that "that is a tree over there," 
"My finding it beyond doubt is not what counts. If a doubt would 
be reasonable that cannot be seen from what I hold. There would 
therefore have to be a rule that declares doubt to be unreasonable 
here. But there isn't such a rule either."16 He even goes so far 
as to claim, "What criterion do you use then? None at all."!? if 
Sextus and Wittgenstein had been completely consistent, they could 
both have made this claim. As it is, Wittgenstein can only make 
it as a personal claim which he violates in dialectic and Sextus 
can make it not at all. I believe that we have here, at last, the 
core of skepticism. For all the modes of argument, all the ranting 
about philosophical disease come down at last to this: a skeptic 
can accept no criterion of truth whatsoever. While its actual 
activity must always be in response to some particular doctrine, 
the attitude that informs skepticism must be both personal and 
universal. At its heart, it is this awareness of the lack of 
criteria that distinguishes true skepticism from philosophies of 
other sorts, including two that are sometimes called skeptical 
which I wish now to consider. 
The first of these is nearly as old as skepticism itself, 
and is still controversial today. I am speaking of academic or 
"mitigated" skepticism. This philosophy arose in the Academy of 
Plato in the third and second centuries B.C., its two strongest 
proponents being Arcesilaus and Carneades.1** Their arguments were 
directed mainly against the Stoics who claimed that some percep-
tions are infallible and that these display their infallibility by 
"signs" that are peculiar to them. The academic skeptics argued 
that there is no criterion for distinguishing fallible from in-
fallible perceptions, that the "signs" were bogus.19 But then 
they went on to hold that even though we lack adequate criteria for 
knowing the truth, we can make reasonable and probable claims. 
Arcesilaus developed the notion of the eulogon, or what appeals to 
reason, as the true and the right. He accepted it that the best 
a man can do is what seems to be most reasonable. In practice, it 
was a matter of weighing arguments which, as I pointed out, the 
true skeptic realizes he cannot do. Carneades, on the other hand, 
worked out the idea of the pithanon, or probable, as a criterion 
for judging perceptions. He does recommend suspension of judgment 
on the truth of perceptions, but he also maintains that they mani-
fest three degrees of probability depending on how much of an obstacle 
they present to belief. Such notions obviously depend on their 
being criteria for judging the degree of probability to be assigned 
as well as the validity of the probability structure in which they 
are assigned. Arcesilaus and Carneades seem not to have been con-
cerned about their rash substitution of the eulogon and the pithanon 
for dogmatists' claims to knowledge. They seem to have been more 
concerned to provide a theoretical foundation for practical living, 
having been intimidated by the criticism that skepticism leads to 
inaction. They both seem to have lost sight of the Pyrrhonian goal 
of ataraxia (though, to be fair, Arcesilaus at least seems to have 
tried to cultivate suspension of judgment) which includes cessation 
of the desire to ask philosophical questions. In losing sight of 
this goal they mitigated their skepticism, but to mitigate skepti-
cism is to fall into the skeptic's paradox, it is to claim knowledge 
of criteria and ultimate ignorance. Significantly, it was Aenesi-
demus who first made this criticism of the academics and it was his 
work that lead to the more thorough-going skepticism of Sextus 
Emiricus. 
In modern times the chief spokesman for mitigated skepticism 
has been David Hume. Perhaps the strongest skeptical argument he 
gives is one related directly to Carneades' pithanon. Instead of 
each successive judgment building a higher probability of truth as 
Carneades thought, Hume says that to judge is to enter on an infinite 
sequence of judgments, each of which, 
tho' it shou'd be favorable to our preceeding judgment, 
being founded only on probability, must weaken still 
further our first evidence and must itself be weaken'd 
by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; 
till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, 
however great we may suppose it to have been, and however 
small the diminution by every new uncertainty.20 
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But he overthrows this devastating conclusion when he adds, "even 
after all we retain a degree of belief . . . (because the action 
of the mind described above) becomes forc'd and unnatural, and 
the ideas faint and obscure . . . the same ideas have not the 
same effect as in a more natural conception of the ideas " (p. 37). 
What is "natural" to us saves us from being inactivated by doubt. 
Hume implicitly accepts a phenomenological criterion when he 
proceeds to dissolve the self and causation by similar arguments. 
In both cases he must assume a position beyond his phenomenal self 
to decide that there is nothing but his phenomenal self and that 
what he calls his self is nothing but a series of impressions which 
are not connected causally. What Hume relies on is phenomenological 
thought experiment. In searching after a certain standard, he has 
turned inward toward buried experience and, finding nothing there, 
decides that nothing is there is reality. But, as Wittgenstein puts 
it, "it is easier to bury a problem than to solve it " (£.-!.•» P' 112 e) . 
There could hardly be a clearer example of philosophical results 
following from philosophical method. Like Sextus, Hume accepts 
mere appearance as his standard for judgment, and even though, as 
Popkin suggests^! Hume may want the arguments only to overcome 
Descartes' cogito and then to purge themselves away as well, we are 
left to judge the force of the arguments by the standards they 
assume. Since the standard there in question is what appears to 
one individual (albeit a remarkable one) at a particular time and 
place under some particular conditions, the conclusions seem dubious. 
If we are to accept such a standard, the fool is as much to be 
believed as the philosopher and, if Hume is right about the condi-
tioning we suffer from "nature," theiE is no reason to expect much 
agreement on the results of any such inquiry between thinkers 
living under diverse conditions. 
Having to his satisfaction destroyed whole realms of inquiry, 
Hume confesses that his intention "is only to make the reader 
sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings 
concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but customs; 
and that belief is moieproperly an act of the sensitive, than of 
the cogitative part of our natures " (p. 183). This recalls 
Arcesilaus' denial of the criticism that skepticism leads to im-
mobility on grounds that the will acts without confirmation of 
thought and without unshakeable belief.22 And, like the academics, 
Hume holds that passion, based on custom and habit, in other words, 
what seems reasonable and probable and offers the least obstruction 
to belief, is_ the proper guide to life. It is not so important 
that in the conflict between his theoretical skepticism and his 
recommendation of belief in causation, the efficacy of reason, the 
existence of the self, etc. (which causes him to squirm a great 
deal), it is not so important that in this conflict, he is caught 
(perhaps willingly) in the skeptic's paradox. What is important, 
and what fundamentally distinguishes Hume from true skepticism, is 
his goal. He has a vision of reality he wishes to bring people to 
believe. Granted, he uses skeptical arguments to gain his end. 
But that alone is insufficient. Pyrrhonism aims at ataraxia, 
which implies cessation of the desire to know the answers to 
philosophical questions. Hume, on the other hand, holds that we 
cannot help but do what is "natural" to us and hence we cannot 
cease philosophizing. But even if we admit Hume as the "consis-
tent Pyrrhonist" that Popkin argues he is,23 he is still an in-
consistent skeptic. For he believes in the ultimate sway of 
"nature" and proceeds to construct an elaborate theory of what 
constitutes "human nature." It is no accident that the phrase is 
prominent in the title of his principal work. 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Hume followed the 
trail cleared by Pyrrho. Pyrrho and Sextus recommended a life 
lived in accordance with nature and the compulsion of the feelings. 
They, like Hume, seem to have believed that there is no alternative. 
Once they saw that neither reason nor the senses could be adequate 
guides, they turned to irrational, dumb natural forces. In form 
this move is not unlike the critical "leap of faith" in fideistic 
systems, the main difference being that it is secular, it makes no 
reference to God. But the role played by nature in Pyrrhonism and 
mitigated skepticism, i.e. secular fideism, is the same role played 
by God in theistic fideism. They are both the ultimate condition-
ing force, the ultimate criterion. It is just here that we can see 
the force of true skepticism most clearly. Wittgenstein's notion 
of forms of life served as the ultimate conditioning force in just 
the way that God and nature do in theistic and secular fideism. 
But his point was that whatever is taken to constitute our form of 
life, whether God, nature, or evil demon, we are by that very con-
dition barred from ever seeing beyond it. If we once accept a 
criterion of truth, that very act of acceptance precludes the 
possibility of finding unconditioned truth, which, after all, is 
the goal of philosophy. In consequence, for example, no ontologi-
cal argument is ultimately believable because for any entity that 
is conceived to necessarily exist, it is possible to conceive some 
condition that necessitates that result, for instance that logic 
requires a metaphysical first principle, and once having grasped 
such a condition, the necessity of the conclusion reached on 
grounds of the condition becomes disconnected from the ultimate 
unconditioned conclusion. The one further point, which is the 
fideistic conclusion, is that acceptance of a criterion, an ultimate 
conditioning force, is a matter of faith. The difference between 
true skepticism and either sort of fideism is that the skeptic has 
refused to make the "leap of faith," he has refused to commit him-
self to a truth he is unable to believe. He has therefore kept 
open every possibility that was before him, while fideism has 
closed them off. 
Theistic fideism is a peculiarly Christian phenomenon, perhaps 
because Christianity is a religion amenable to philosophical in-
quiry. It is also a peculiarly modern phenomenon, having arisen 
as a widely held doctrine only after the work of Sextus was re-
introduced in the early sixteenth century and popularized by 
Montaigne in the 1580's. In his "Apology for Raymond de Sebonde," 
Montaigne used most of the tropoi of the ancient skeptics, Meno's 
paradox and considerable wit and grace of style to undermine 
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rational and experiential know ledge. 2 4 Then he went on to claim 
that this ruinous Pyrrhonism was in reality the only true prepara-
tion of the soul for divine illumination and that the Pyrrhonists' 
demand for conservative life would lead people who had seen the 
force of skepticism back into the arms of mother church. This form 
of fiedism reached its culmination in the work of Pierre Bayle at 
the close of the seventeenth century. In his Dictionary, which was 
avidly read by David Hume,25 Bayle makes use of virtually every 
skeptical gambit to be found anywhere before him and he appears to 
have invented some of his own, e.g., that a statement may be both 
self-evident and false.26 Perhaps his favorite weapon is the 
technique of pushing claims to their logical extreme to show their 
absurdity. After he has logically refuted his opponents'doctrines, 
he goes on in several instances to claim that since reason is in-
capable of attaining knowledge, we must look at faith for the way 
out of skeptical dissolution. Following Montaigne, he welcomes 
Pyrrhonism as the philosophy roost receptive to Christian faith 
because it not only dissolves everyone else's reason, it must dis-
solve its own. "The natural conclusion of this ought to be to re-
nounce this guide and to implore the cause of all things to give 
us a better one . . . A man is therefore happily disposed toward 
faith when he knows how defective reason is " (pp. 205-206). Since 
Montaigne and Bayle obviously sought to destroy reason merely for 
the sake of religion, it is clear that they retained the desire to 
know the answers to philosophical questions, the only change being 
that the Christian God replaced reflection as the source of knowledge. 
This is in clear contradiction to the Pyrrhonian goal of ataraxia, a 
state which implies the cessation of the desire to know. Bayle and 
Montaigne seem also to mistake the target of skepticism. They 
believed it to be reason, when in fact it is faith in dogmatic 
assertions. 
As Popkin has pointed out,26 there is in Bayle's Dictionary a 
noticeable lack of the religious fervor we find in fideists like 
Pascal. It is important to set Bayle's calm critical attitude 
along side the zealous passion of existentialist fideists, for it 
is apparent from this (as well as from the testimony of Sextus* 5) 
that despair is not a necessary consequence of skeptical dissolu-
tion of belief. Kierkegaard is perhaps the best example of really 
passionate fideism. True to the fiedist form, Kierkegaard used a 
whole range of standard skeptical techniques against the prevailing 
dogmatism of his time, Hegelianism. He reminds us again and again 
of the incompleteness of the Hegelian System and juxtaposes this 
with what he believes to be the necessity for ethical commitment 
that the incompleteness of the Hegelian System renders impossible. 
He makes the general claim that philosophy cannot produce knowledge 
of reality because the only reality that counts, Christ and the in-
dividual's relation to Him, is essentially absurd.2? Recognizing 
this, the individual is thrust immediately into despair, a disease 
for which Kierkegaard provides the remedy, the notorious "leap of 
faith," total commitment to live according to the dictates of the 
subjective relationship with God. It is impossible to construe 
Kierkegaard as a true skeptic because of this doctrine of commit-
ment. Either one accepts God in all His absurdity/Or one is lost 
in sin and despair. It is fundamental to true skepticism that 
there be a suspension of judgment and abstention from belief. The 
despair that so vitally concerns Kierkegaard is a sympton of his 
unwillingness to give up his desire for absolute truth after 
skepticism has produced conviction of its fultility. This in-
volves the two fundamental mistakes of fideism, whether secular 
or theistic. The first is believing on theoretical grounds that 
truth in any usual sense is impossible, which involves the skeptic's 
paradox. The second is believing that we ought to be able to ac-
quire truth anyway. The result is acceptance of the absurd or the 
irrational as the truth. 
These examples of fideism reveal another important feature of 
skepticism. More than any other philosophy, skepticism is an attack 
upon faith. The opponent of skeptical argument is always dogmatism. 
Fideists and mitigated skeptics fail to be true skeptics because 
they fail to turn the full strength of their skepticism on their 
own dogmas. They are therefore caught at the outset in the skeptic's 
paradox. But more importantly, these philosophers do not aim at 
ataraxia in the full sense of no longer desiring to know. Rather, 
they aim at some personal relationship with God or they adhere to 
some subjective sophistical standard. They miss what amounts to 
the essential insight of skepticism, that all skeptical activity 
is negative, that the skeptic only doubts and that doubt is an 
utterly vacuous, an utterly neutral, condition, not giving rise to 
any positive assertion at all. The skeptic is like some super-
hard metal against which bullets of doctrine are fired, but which, 
being impervious to their force, only richochets them back into the 
minds in which they were forged. The true skeptic is no more than 
a gadfly, always tormenting believers, but never being caught by 
the hand of faith. 
University of Kansas 
57 
NOTES 
Eward Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. 
Oswald J. Reichel (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 519-20. 
2Norman Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus 
(London: MacMillan & Co., 1869), p. 30. 
3Zeller, o£. cit., pp. 521-27. Maccoll, op_. cit., pp. 21ff. 
Philip P. Hallie, Scepticism, Man and God. Selections from the 
Major Writings of Sextus Empiricus (Middleton: Wesleyan university 
Press, 1964), Introduction. 
4Hallie, ibid., p. 16. 
5Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (London: Collier 
Books, 1969), p. 55. 
6Zeller, o£. cit., pp. 520-21. 
F r e d e r i c k Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, vol. I, 
part II (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1962) , p. 187. 
8Maccoll, 0£>. cit., p. 69. 
9Ibid., p. 72. 
1 0Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. R. G. Bury 
(New York: Loab Classical Library, 1933), I, p. 7. 
^Arguing against Arcesilaus, Sextus says, "whereas we make 
these statements [that the end is epoche and that it is accompanied 
by ataraxia) not positively but in accordance with what appears to 
us, he makes them as statements of real facts . . . " ibid., p. 143. 
1 2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, Basil Blackwell & Mott, 1958) , p. 133 e. 
1 3 P . F. Strawson, "Persons," The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. C. 
Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey! Prentice Hall, 1962), 
p. 135. 
58 
14 _, .. . , . _ . , _ _ . , .. Michel de Montaigne, apology for Raimond De Sebonde," 
Essays, II, 12, trans. Charles Cotton, ed. W. Carew Hazlitt 
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1952), p. 287. 
1 5Sextus, op_. cit., p. 21. 
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and 
G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 59*2. 
17 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, IdT G. H. von Wright, 
R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge, Massachusettes: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 184 e. 
18 
Zeller, op_. cit., pp. 528-62. Hallie, o£. cit., pp. 17-24. 
Copleston, op_. cit., pp. 158-61. Mary Mills Patrick, The Greek 
Skeptics (New York: Columbia university Press, 1929), pp. 31-197. 
19 
This controversy shows striking resemblance to that between 
Descartes and Gassendi over the infallibility of 'clearness' and 
'distinctness' as criteria for the truth. 
20 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Biggs 
(Oxford University Press, 1968FT p. 182. 
21 
Richard Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique 
of Pyrrhonism," Hume, ed. V. C. Chappell (Garden City, New York: 
Anchor Books, 1966), p. 53ff. 
22 
Zeller, op_. cit. , p. 534. 
2 3 
Popkin, op_. cit., pp. 53-98. 
24 
Montaigne, op_. cit., pp. 208-94. Also, Richard H. Popkin, 
The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: Van 
Gorcum & Co., I960), pp. 44-60. 
25 
Richard H. Popkin, "Skepticism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Paul Edwards, (New York: MacMillan & The Free Press, 1^67), p. 455, 
26 
Pierre Bayle, "Pyrrho," in Historical and Critical Dictionary, 
Selections, trans. Richard H. Popkin 6 Craig Brush (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 199-203. Also, Richard H. Popkin, 
"The High Road to Pyrrhonism," American Philosophical Quarterly, 
2 (1965) , p. 27. It should be remarked that the type of statements 
Bayle considers self-evident are such as "things which are not 
different from a third thing are not different from each other," 
and the demonstrations of their falsehood are such as "the mystery 
of the Trinity." Even though it is obvious from a secular 
philosophical point of view that these arguments show nothing 
because they rely upon accepting Church dogmas, it is also clear 
that Bayle is here in the Pyrrhonian tradition of using arguments 
only as strong as necessary to upset given claims by using the 
standard the claimant sets for himself. 
59 
Ibid., footnote, p. 206. 
27S/ören Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. 
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1941), p. 188. 
^ 
60 
THE MEAN 
K. L. Helstrom 
Considering the place of virtue in Aristotle's ethics, it 
is important both to clarify the notion of the mean and to 
determine how its connection to virtue adds clarification to 
the notion of virtue itself. There are two different inter-
pretations of the mean that might be drawn from Aristotle's 
writings. The first, though seeming to be the most natural, is 
an implausible interpretation and one to which Aristotle himself 
is not committed. The second, for the most part implicit in 
the discussion, escapes the most obvious difficulties that con-
front the first but leads to further difficulties. But if the 
notion of the mean remains somewhat obscure, then nothing has 
been gained by the definition of virtue in terms of the mean. 
Assuming that to aim toward the mean is characteristic of 
virtue, two distinct questions arise for any proposed inter-
pretation of the mean. First, for any virtuous action is it 
always true that it has the properties required by the inter-
pretation? Second, if we are perplexed about whether a certain 
action is virtuous or not, will the mean as so interpreted pro-
vide a criterion for resolving this perplexity? Any definition 
of virtue must give practical criteria for assessing particular 
actions or passions; it must be not only theoretically correct 
but also materially adequate. This point needs to be emphasized, 
since ethics is for Aristotle a practical science. To be able 
to aim at virtue, which is the essence of the moral life, requires 
that one be able to judge the virtue of alternative courses of 
action. Thus these two questions provide an adequate test for 
any interpretation of the mean. 
The first interpretation is that of the mathematical sense 
of mean, for which the differences between virtues and vices 
will be matters of degree. One characteristic of virtue that 
Aristotle cites is to be "destroyed by excess and defect and pre-
served by the mean" (N.E., 1104a25). This terminology of excess, 
defect, and mean naturally suggests this type of interpretation. 
Reinforcement is found in Aristotle's treatment of justice, 
particularly of corrective justice. At several points in the 
Politics and Nichomachean Ethics, he indicates a connection 
between justice and the mean,* so that one needs only to notice 
the mathematical model in terms of which justice is analyzed to 
derive a strong presumption for an analogous interpretation of 
the mean. 
Can a plausible case, which is consistent with the 
Nichomachean Ethics, be made for such an interpretation? That 
it cannot should be evident from seeking an answer to the second 
question above. Against the determination of the virtues by 
seeking some sort of mathematical mean, four, not necessarily 
